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The law relating to broadcasting by political parties is surveyed, and the rele-
vant legislation and policy is examined. Specific examples of legislative and
policy changes are provided. The Canadian approach to protection of free
speech has been through regulation. This is compared with the American expe-
rience and, in this context, the constitutional aspects of the area are discussed.
"Some people like government so much, they want to buy it."
Harry S. Truman
With the dawn of the era of electronic politics and the escalating
cost of partisan advocacy, Canadian broadcasting laws have changed to
meet a difficult challenge: the facilitation of free speech while main-
taining fair and equitable exposure in the face of potentially over-
whelming partisan spending. In the aftermath of Canada's thirty-third
general election, this paper will review the body of law relating to par-
tisan television programming in Canada at the federal level to illustrate
how Canadian legislators and regulators have approached this chal-
lenge in the past and will suggest how they may be expected to ap-
proach it in the future. Underpinning the history of sponsored partisan
broadcasting and the Canadian regulatory response is the assumption
that broadcasting (through television especially) is the most influential
and therefore the most politically sensitive medium of communication
in Canada.1
Canadian party political broadcasting regulation, as it has devel-
oped to 1984, stresses careful restriction as a means of protecting and
controlling the political process. In the course of tracing this general
policy thrust, the administrative-institutional web of influence often
comes to the fore, most particularly in the role of the Canadian Broad-
casting Corporation (CBC) as a major instrument of policy and the
o Copyright, 1984, John LaCalamita.
* Mr. LaCalamita is a member of the graduating class of 1984, at the University of Toronto
Law School. He is currently articling with Fraser & Beatty, Toronto.
I This assumption was endorsed most recently in the Canadian context by Isenberg, Can You
spend Your Way into the House of Commons? (1980), 11 Optimum 28; and again in Spend and
Win? Another Look at Federal Election Expenses (1981), 12 Optimum 5. For an early work on
the general thesis, see Jacobsen, The Impact of Broadcast Campaigning on Electoral Outcomes
(1975), 37 J. Pol. 769.
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heretofore controlling influence of the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) as regulator. The nature
and extent of the discretion left to individual broadcasters and partisan
media technocrats within the regulatory framework is noted as well.
The heart of this study is an examination of several political
broadcasting issues which illustrate the contentions and concerns out-
lined above. These issues include both the doctrine of equitable alloca-
tion of broadcast time (whether free time or paid time) and the past
controversy over dramatization in political broadcasting. In these areas,
the dividing line between law and politics is often unclear, as the inter-
ests being regulated are often, in fact, those of the regulators
themselves.
The most involving focus, as far as the main thesis of this paper is
concerned, is the area of equitable allocation of broadcast time. The
law in this area perhaps best reflects the regulatory dynamic tension of
a plurality of broadcasting interests and philosophies. The existence of
free time rules, rate regulation, state subsidies and rules concerning al-
location of paid time by party preference in the 1974 amendments to
the Canada Elections Act 2 reveals an inchoate faith on the part of the
regulators in the necessity of legal restriction to confer balance on a
powerful medium of political communication.
The conclusion of this paper raises an implicit constitutional con-
cern about the overall direction of Canadian laws governing political
broadcasting. Do the ramifications of a restrictive scheme in political
programming lead to the conclusion that the freedoms of the broad-
caster or the unsponsored advocate are being infringed? What of the
virtual monopoly on speech given to "registered parties" during a cam-
paign? Should the broadcaster be prodded uneasily into a regulatory
straitjacket simply because of the fear that money,3 in tandem with
televised mass communication may lead to a poisoning of the political
process? These final questions, and particularly the answers given to
them in the American experience, may be relevant to the development
of Canadian party political broadcasting well into the 1980s.
2 The Election Expenses Act R.S.C. 1973-74, c. 51, amending the Canada Elections Act, as
am. by R.S.C. 1970, c. 14 (Ist Supp.), as am. by R.S.C. 1970, c. 10. (2nd Supp.), as am. by S.C.
1977-78, c. 3, as am. by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164.
3 Sometimes equated with speech in American constitutional doctrine. See the seminal Su-
preme Court decision in Buckley v. Valeo 424 U.S. 1 (1976) at 16, 96 S.C. 612 (1976) at 632.
[VOL. 22, No. 3
Political Broadcasting
I. A HISTORY OF PARTY POLITICAL USE OF BROAD-
CASTING IN CANADA
1.1. Legislation
Radio came to Canada in 1918. By 1928, the first of several stud-
ies was completed with the Report of the Royal Commission on Radio
Broadcasting (Aird Commission). From the very first, the goal of social
cohesion and the role of government were stressed.4 Politics was being
transformed by broadcasting, although platform orators of the period
continued to view the medium stylistically as no more than an exten-
sion of the audience.5 This impression was soon changed with the effec-
tive response to FDR's "fireside chats" in the United States and to the
oratorical style of William "Bible Bill" Aberhart in Alberta. Therefore
the Aird Commission emphasized the palpable fear of political propa-
gandizing in its recommendations:
While we are of the opinion that broadcasting of political matters should not be
altogether banned, nevertheless, we consider that it should be very carefully re-
stricted under arrangements mutually agreed upon by all political parties
concerned. 6
The seminal proposals concerning the new broadcast medium of
the 1920s and 1930s accordingly evolved into a general call for public
control through a mixed system of publicly-owned high-power stations
and local privately-owned affiliates.7 The result of this call was the pas-
sage of the 1932 Canadian Radio Broadcasting Act8 creating the Ca-
nadian Radio Broadcasting Commission (CRBC, later the CBC). The
CRBC had the dual role of operating a national radio service and regu-
lating licensing, programming and commercials for all Canadian
broadcasts. In the House of Commons, the question of free access to
the public airwaves often arose, and the words of the Leader of the
Opposition provide an insight into the policy considerations which
would shape the extent and content of future political broadcasting
regulation:
[I]t would be quite proper that some provision should be made whereby each
political party which has a representative following should be entitled to have
4 Young, The Voices of Democracy: Politics and Communication in Canada (1981), 14 Can.
J. Pol. Sci. 686.
5 Nolan, The Evolution of National Policy in Canada with respect to the Party Political
Uses of Radio and Television (unpublished M.A. thesis, U. West. Ont., 1976) at 31.
6 Reprinted in Can., Report of the Committee on Election Expenses (Barbeau Report)
(1966).
7Weir, The Struggle for National Broadcasting in Canada (1965) at 117-23.
8 S.C. 1932, c. 51.
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broadcast at the expense of the state one or two addresses which would set forth
its platform or policies before the people . . . Apart from that, I think there
ought to be some definite understanding that radio, where it is to be used for
political purposes, will be used in a manner which will not give to one party
which may happen to have more in the way of financial backing than other par-
ties, a larger use of that national instrument. 9
Following the 1935 general election, perceived abuses in the politi-
cal use of broadcasting'0 led to a report by a Special Committee on
Broadcasting. The recommendations of this Committee gave impetus to
the passage of the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation Act in 19361"
creating the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. Section 22 of this
Act'2 sets out clear prohibitions with respect to dramatization, blackout
rules prior to polling day and sponsorship identification requirements.
However, the legislation itself did not solve the largely organizational
problem of equitable allocation of time. The first Chairman of the CBC
Board of Governors, Leonard W. Brockington, K.C., cited the bland
regulatory directive to allocate time "as fairly as possible"'13 as an ex-
ample of the need at that time for legislation to provide his office with
more guidance. The laws on political broadcasting from 1936 to 1958
were generally cautious and conservative. In 1970, a former president
of the Canadian Association of Broadcasters, Finlay Payne, giving evi-
dence before a Special Committee on Election Expenses, summarized
the feeling of broadcasters by saying that the 1936 regulations dictated
that "political broadcasting must be as dull and uninteresting as possi-
ble . . . . We lived in a dull, grey atmosphere foisted on us by [this]
legislation."' 4
From 1936 to 1958, the CBC performed the dual roles of broad-
caster and regulator, amid growing unrest from private broadcasters.
The style of electronic media campaigns in this period had changed
with the technology. By 1957, the development of better television
equipment brought about more dramatic and free-flowing partisan ad-
vertising, and the coverage of the 1956 Progressive Conservative lead-
ership convention and the federal elections of 1957 and 1958 signalled
the awakening of political parties to the efficacy of television. 15 Techno-
9 Rt. Hon. W.L. Mackenzie-King, in Can. H. of C. Deb., June 30, 1934, at 4511.
10 For example, the sale of broadcast time on credit. See Barbeau Report, supra note 6, at
364.
ii S.C. 1936, c. 24. [Hereinafter the Broadcasting Act].
Specifically, ss. 22(3), (4), (5).
's Barbeau Report, supra note 6, at 364.
14 Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Special Committee on Election Expenses,
Dec. 15, 1970, Iss. 7 at 7:68.
15 Supra note 5, at 55.
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logical change brought legislative change.
In 1958 the 1936 Broadcasting Act was revised, 16 and a new regu-
latory authority separate from the CBC was established: the Board of
Broadcast Governors (BBG). This revision is notable because it demon-
strates the extraordinarily conservative attitude toward political pro-
gramming. The 1936 conservative policy was maintained in the 1958
Act. Section 11 of the Act not only retained the ban on dramatized
partisan broadcasts, sponsorship identification and the blackout rules,
but also gave the BBG authority to make regulations concerning the
compulsory provision, equitable allocation and reporting of partisan
broadcasts. In practice, however, the BBG simply laid down general
guidelines for free time broadcasts and left it to the parties and the
broadcasters to agree on the details. While section 11 certainly gave
the BBG the power to compel equitable solutions and to assign party
time periods, the non-employment of this power left these decisions in
the hands of the broadcasters.11
The rise of a new era of electoral politics in the 1960s, in which
the "advance man" and advertising agencies played a more central
role, led to an increase in the legislative influence of the media techno-
crat. As well, the exigencies of the television medium and its relatively
great cost led to partisan focus on image-oriented "spot" broadcasts of
national scope. The interaction of these two developments further pro-
pelled television to the forefront of political communication.
The new era was ushered in by a further revision to the Broad-
casting Act" prior to the 1968 federal election. This created the cur-
rent mechanism of government supervision, the CRTC.19 With the li-
censing of large private stations to serve major urban markets through
the early 1960s, and the licensing of the private English-language CTV
network in 1961, the scope of the new agency's regulatory authority
was increased. By 1972, the CRTC had also licensed Global Communi-
cations Limited to serve the southern Ontario market. The CRTC now
had comprehensive power to license and supervise all aspects of a
booming broadcast system, including cable television. 20 To provide a
check on the CRTC's authority, provision was made for a right of ap-
peal to Cabinet from CRTC decisions. Yet it is believed that the first
10 S.C. 1958, c. 22.
17 Supra note 5, at 66.
18 S.C. 1967-68, c. 25.
19 The Canadian Radio-television Commission, renamed the Canadian Radio-television and
Telecommunications Commission in 1982-83.
20 Boyer, Money and Message: The Law Governing Election Financing, Advertising, Broad-
casting and Campaigning in Canada (1983) at 459.
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Chairman of the newly created CRTC (and former BBG Governor),
Pierre Juneau, requested that a procedural mechanism be included to
thwart meddlesome politicians from interceding on behalf of
licensees.2
In terms of the exercise of regulatory power, the CRTC is far
more flexible than its predecessors, often allowing the media techno-
crats in the world of partisan political broadcasting to set new stan-
dards. The effective lifting of the previous rigid strictures against dram-
atization is an example of this, and will be discussed in greater detail.
In addition to its powers under the 1968 Broadcasting Act, the
CRTC has authority to allocate broadcast time in federal elections pur-
suant to the reform-oriented Canada Elections Act of 1974. Amend-
ments22 to the original Canada Elections Act require that broadcasters
make an aggregate of six and one-half hours of prime time radio and
television available to registered parties during a twenty-eight day cam-
paign period. Under section 99.1 (9), the CRTC is expressly given the
power of binding allocation should the parties disagree on time alloca-
tions. Section 99.1 (18) makes it incumbent upon private network
broadcasters to provide free time to the parties (a practice that the
CBC, as the direct arm of government policy, has always seen as politi-
cally wholesome and has practiced since 1940).23
While the adage that "Money is the mother's milk of politics"
may be accepted as accurate, a fear that it might poison the political
process24 (especially in the costly arena of political broadcasting) 25 re-
sulted in the CRTC indirectly acquiring more expansive powers. The
upward spiral of campaign costs and the scandals attendant on the un-
regulated flow of political funds in the Watergate era occasioned a
comprehensive attempt to ensure political fairness through close legal
scrutiny and direction. These efforts are now reflected in several opera-
tive sources of broadcasting law and policy.
One such source is, of course, the Broadcasting Act. 20 Section
16(1)(b)(iii) gives the CRTC authority to make assignments of broad-
2 Supra note 5, at 93.
22 S.C. 1973-74, c. 51; S.C. 1977, c. 3.
22 Supra note 5, at 93.
24 A fear expressed by Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech? (1976), 85
Yale L. J. 1001.
22 See Downs and Karpen, The Equal Time and Fairness Doctrines: Outdated or Crucial to
American Politics in the 1980s? (1981), 4 Comm./Ent. 67 for an explanation of the necessity for
reform which ultimately attached itself to the Canadian polity.
28 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-1i; as am. by R.S.C. 1970, c. 16 (1st Supp.); R.S.C. 1970, c. 10 (2nd
Supp.); S.C. 1973-74, c. 51; S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 49.
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cast time based on equitable allocation principles. Regulations under
the Broadcasting Act require stations to broadcast political program-
ming in accordance with CRTC directives. Further, section 6 of the
Radio (AM) Broadcasting Regulation, section 7 of the Radio (FM)
Broadcasting Regulations and section 9 of the Television Broadcasting
Regulations7 all include provisions requiring unequivocally that broad-
casters allocate partisan advertising time equitably among all parties
and rival candidates.
The more important provisions of the 1974 amendments to the Ca-
nada Elections Act which affect political broadcasting include: sections
13.7 and 61.2, which limit the length of the electoral campaign for
candidates and parties respectively; section 70.1, which restricts the
right to advertise during a campaign to registered candidates and par-
ties; and section 99, which deals with the central issues of current Ca-
nadian party political broadcasting. These issues include allocation of
time, state subsidies for party expenditures on broadcasting, and rate
regulation for broadcast time.
1.2. Policy
In the murkier world of the policy directive, both the CRTC and
the CBC have generally adhered to the principles which evolved from
radio regulation in the 1930s. The basic regulatory principles respect-
ing political broadcasts and equitable doctrine were first fully enunci-
ated in a CBC White Paper released in 1939.8 In the intervening pe-
riod, basic policy has only grudgingly given ground to broadcaster and
party concerns. Indeed, these underlying principles have survived four
major revisions of policy in the last twenty years. However, a study of
policy circulars, issued by CBC/CRTC regulatory agencies to guide
licensees through election campaigns, indicates that relationships
among the actors in the broadcasting system have changed over the
years.29
Even after regulatory power was transferred from the CBC to the
BBG/CRTC, the CBC's own policy remained important, since it often
went further than the policies of the regulatory body with respect to
the practical application of equitable restrictions. The CBC is a unique
element in the study of political broadcasting law due to its mandate,
27 Radio (AM) Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 379; Radio (FM) Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c.
380; Television Regulations C.R.C. 1978, c. 381.
28 Statement of Policy With Respect to Controversial Broadcasting, issued by the BBG, Ot-
tawa, July 8, 1939.
29 Supra note 20, at 431.
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derived from section 3 of the Broadcasting Act. 30 Part of this mandate
(section 3(g)) requires that the CBC be a national service to provide
balanced programming, to contribute to the flow of information, and to
develop national unity. More significantly, section 3(h) stipulates that
should there be any conflict with private broadcasting interests, the res-
olution of these conflicts shall always be in favour of the public interest
and the objectives of the CBC. Thus, CBC policy supports the para-
mountcy of the national interest in conflicts involving partisan broad-
casting. For this reason, the comprehensive Party Political Broadcasts
statement issued by the CBC in 197731 (and fundamentally unaltered
in the more general Journalistic Policy manual issued in 1982) is an
important addition to the sources which illustrate a firm tradition of
government restriction of the public airwaves in the field of political
broadcasting.
While the original basic tenets of Canadian broadcasting law and
policy survived well into the television era, it should be noted that the
nature of this particular medium, as a matter of general understanding,
is unique. In Canada, the rise of "hired gun" advertising agencies and
media buying services has accompanied a change in electioneering to
accommodate the necessities of the medium. Politicians in the 1980s
accept the imperative of selling themselves like a consumer product in
a competitive marketplace. 32 Television provides larger audiences to na-
tional political parties than could be secured through other campaign
methods. The medium's pervasiveness may mean that it can overcome
voter defense mechanisms, such as selective exposure patterns. a3 Televi-
sion can motivate and persuade the low-interest or "floating" voter.34 In
a more onimous vein, television retains the largest degree of popular
trust, yet holds the greatest ability to restructure reality. 30 Perhaps this
ability has its roots in the advancing technology of the medium itself,
allowing the political advertiser to change the context of words and
images.
Because television is not as substantive a medium as print, the rise
of the "spot" advertisement has become precipitous.3" The very nature
of the selection, presentation and format peculiarities of the medium
30 R.S.C. 1970, c. B-11, s. 3.
31 CBC Party Political Broadcasts: A Statement of CBC Policy and Procedures, (Ottawa,
April, 1977.) Reprinted in the "Redbook Manual" of CBC Policy.
32 Minnow and Mitchell, Incumbent Television (1976), 425 Annals 75.
13 Blumler, et al., The Challenge of Election Broadcasting (1978) at 67.
34 Palda, Does Advertising Influence Votes? (1973), 6 Can. J. of Pol. Sci. 639.
35 Downs and Karpen, supra note 25, at 78.
30 Id. at 80; Blumler and McQuail, Television in Politics (1969).
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may now in fact set the agenda of campaign issues. Inevitably, Cana-
dian politics has entered the age of the sixty second catch-phrase. At a
time when the electoral fortunes of national parties can turn on the
short, punchy messages conveyed by leadership image-makers, the
power of television to foster and exploit voter volatility makes it the
subject of great scrutiny by the forces of regulation.
This interplay of partisan politics and electronic media has led to
new styles of campaigning which, in turn, have required new legislative
instruments. But the government regulators are usually a stride behind
in the task of accommodating innovation and technological dexterity
with a workable, equitable framework of administrative rules. In the
process itself, tensions have developed between the media technocrats
(the bearers of the new technology), the candidates and the regulators,
who have continually had to change their tactical and legal postures.
37
II. PARTIES AT WAR: OPERATIVE ASPECTS OF BROAD-
CAST REGULATION AND THE POLITICAL CAMPAIGN
Laws regulating campaign political programming may fairly be
said to have a thematic consistency. It is important to note that "politi-
cal programming" is distinct from what has been called "controversial
programming," although the rules that govern the former have strong
links with the principles associated with the latter.-"
In the CBC White Paper of 1939, 31 the policy with regard to
"controversial programming" was enunciated only in the context of ra-
dio broadcasting, yet it has effectively endured to the present day.40
The touchstone of the policy is the prevention of "any attempt to regi-
ment opinion or to throttle freedom of utterance." 41 Founded on the
legal premises of the Broadcasting Act, the regulatory policy states
that the "air belongs to the people" and that the "incalculable medium
of broadcasting" should "remain at the disposal of the nation. '42 In
policy terms, the advocacy of full interchanges of opinion is directly
tied to the aim of preventing the airwaves from falling into the hands
of wealth or party power. This was echoed in a BBG circular in 1962,43
" Supra note 5, at iv.
'o The term "political programming" also includes reporting by broadcasters on the conduct
and policies of the parties and their representatives. Supra note 20, at 434.
29 Supra note 28.
40 Supra note 20.
41 Supra note 28, at 35.
42 Id. at para. 46.
43 BBG Circular 51, (January 1, 1962).
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which made direct reference to "equal and fair presentation of all main
points of view."
In the area of "political broadcasting", the subject of this paper,
these principles have been manifested by more specific enactments .
Unlike the wider area of "controversial broadcasting", the rules gov-
erning "political broadcasting" leave broadcasters far less discretion."
This relative specificity highlights the general policy of restricted access
to assure fairness. While it is true that broadcasters continue to be left
to their own devices in implementing policy, the hallmark of regulatory
guidelines is still fundamental control from the centre.40
The balance of Part II provides examples of this control and de-
scribes situations where partisan media technocrat and broadcaster
have achieved some measure of de-regulation.
I.1 Free Time Broadcasts
Due to the increasing cost of advertising, and because democratic
principles require the adequate dissemination of party policies and plat-
forms, it has long been a matter of public policy to provide free time
broadcasts, including commercially oriented time slots. Since 1940, an
appreciable number of laws have developed to provide for this during
federal election campaigns. Free time availability in particular is the
product of the policies of the national public network (the CBC). The
existence of free time contrasts with the American experience with the
emphasis on out-spending opponents in the absence of close expenditure
regulation.40
The issue of government regulation of free time also raises the
question of a right of reply to the free time partisan television broad-
casts. The CBC has long considered its policy on the right of reply to
be a necessary adjunct to free time policies.47 It is CBC policy that any
party or candidates not qualified for a free time period may reply at the
discretion of the Corporation if an opponent refers to it or them during
another free time broadcast. The regulatory framework's underlying
44 Morris, The CHNS Case: An Emerging Fairness Doctrine for Canada? (1972), 4 Can.
Comm. L. R. at 28-29.
41 See Baum, Controversial Broadcasting in Canada (1970), 8 Osgoode Hall L. J. 159 at
160-64.
46 Blumler et al, supra note 36, at 16.
See CBC, Jounalistic Policy Manual, (Ottawa, Aug., 1982) at 41, which contains the
current corporation policy on a right of reply:
The right of reply does not exist in law. It follows, however, from the journalistic principles
of fairness that a need for remedial action will be recognized if it has been established that
significant unfairness has occurred. The type of remedial action will be determined by tak-
ing into account the nature and occasion of unfairness.
[VOL. 22, No. 3
Political Broadcasting
fairness doctrine supports this policy of political programming.
On the question of equitable allocation in political broadcasting
generally, the 1929 Aird Commission Report rejected the idea of a free
market of political expression in favour of controlled access to broad-
casting facilities. 8 Regulation was seemingly born out of a desire to
discourage political programming without actually prohibiting it.4" Per-
haps for this reason, free time political programming was made condi-
tional upon an agreement among parties as to time allocation. To as-
sure fairness through restriction, the regulatory body developed a
formula by which air time would be allocated among various extant
official parties, regardless of minor adjustments sought through inter-
party negotiation. Section 11 (1) (d) of the 1958 Broadcasting Act5" car-
ried the basic concept behind this into law, and gave the CBC author-
ity to assign time. This power had the potential to draw the CBC into
the political arena, but in practice the government corporation was re-
luctant to employ it.
The formula for equitable allocation of time provided that where
parties could not reach an agreement as between themselves, the CBC
could allow the free time to be divided equally if there were only two
official parties. Should more than two parties qualify under this defini-
tion, forty per cent of the available time would go to the government
party, with the remaining sixty per cent allocated to the opposition par-
ties.51 The current subsections regarding allocation of free time are
subsections 99.1 (18), (19) and (20) of the Canada Elections Act.
Network operators are required by subsections 99.1(18), (19) and
(20) of the Canada Elections Act to make network time available dur-
ing the twenty-eight day campaign period for free time partisan broad-
casts by "registered" political parties. But because the legislation omits
to specify that the reserved time must be "prime time," free time
broadcasts are usually shunted to time slots that greatly reduce their
viewing audience.52 This may contribute to an increase in party de-
mands for more effectively scheduled paid time slots. The amount of
48 Supra note 20, at 438.
49 Supra note 45, at 160.
10 S. 1 l(1)(d) of the 1958 Act reads as follows:
(1) The Corporation may make regulations:
(d) respecting the proportion of time that may be devoted to the broadcasting of pro-
grams, advertisements or announcements of a partisan political character and the assign-
ment of such time on an equitable basis to all parties and rival candidates.
8 Barbeau Report, supra note 6, at 385.
52 Ontario Commission on Election Expenses and Campaign Contributions, Canadian Elec-
tion Reform: Dialogue on Issues and Effects, 1982 (1983) at 88. Interview with media executive
Peter Swain.
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free time each network is prepared to offer political parties is decided
in consultation with the CRTC. The regulatory body must approve of
the network's proposal. In the 1979 campaign, the CBC network (Eng-
lish and French language) provided three and one-half hours while
CTV and TVA provided three and one-half hours and one hour, respec-
tively.53 In all cases, the CRTC had to be satisfied as to the adequacy
of these allocations.
The very existence of free time, as noted earlier, has long been a
cornerstone of public policy in the area of political broadcasting. It is
closely linked with the general policy of restricted access through gov-
ernment-supervised allocative schemes. Given the acceptance of the
idea of public ownership of the airwaves, codified in section 3(a) of the
Broadcasting Act, it is only a short step to the argument that those
seeking public office should not have to pay in order to communicate
with Canadians through a jointly-owned medium. 4 In this area, regu-
lators rely directly on freedom of speech arguments: to charge those
officially doing public business for the use of public airwaves might re-
sult in comparable curtailment of the freedom of speech of others who
wish to do public business but who have less financial support for their
equally relevant views.
The 1939 CBC White Paper clearly established policy along these
lines. During federal campaigns, the CBC provided free time to recog-
nized parties based on standard criteria concerning representation in
the House. Time allocation depended upon party standing in the House
and popular vote totals from the previous election. As well, there was
an "equalization" factor which precluded untoward lopsidedness.50 Fi-
nally, provision was made for new parties that could prove their sub-
stance through constituency nominations, national organization and
other comparable indicia.
While these moves seemed to give the CBC regulators of the pe-
riod decisive powers, in practice, many stations could refuse to provide
local free time to qualifying candidates whom they disliked. They could
also refuse to carry the network free time broadcasts allocated by the
CBC network to a party for the same reason. This was the case in
1953, when the Communist Party qualified for free time allotments
amounting to fifteen minutes. Some stations refused to carry the broad-
casts and CBC regulators could do no more than request an explana-
tion from these broadcasters.
53 Supra note 20, at 470.
54 Supra note 20, at 441.
5 Id.
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The CBC network itself had a general and long standing policy of
refusing to sell air time to political parties. This policy was altered in
1974, when changes to the Canada Elections Act made it incumbent
upon all broadcasters in the system to accept payment from the parties
for six and one-half hours of reserved prime time to be made available
during the permissible advertising period in federal campaigns.56 As a
Crown corporation receiving an annual vote of funds from Parliament,
the CBC was reluctant to see this old policy changed indirectly through
statutory enactment. As well, the CBC had come to view itself as a
public sector bridgehead in an industry dominated by the private sector
in North America. The continued existence of free time allocations,
after the statutory requirement for paid time broadcasting, and in the
face of an overwhelming desire for commercial political broadcasting,
is attributable to the continued survival of CBC faith in the value of
free time to the fulfillment of its higher legislative mandate. The Amer-
ican experience, by contrast, has imposed an enormous financial burden
on candidates and parties by insisting that time must be purchased in
all cases.57
Free time political broadcasts during election campaigns are the
purview of network broadcasters only. While individual broadcasters
can donate time to parties and candidates,58 they must do so on an
equitable basis, and only after obtaining written authority from the
party and informing the party of the commercial value of this free
time. If the value of the time exceeds one hundred dollars, the benefi-
ciary (party) must disclose the broadcaster's identity in its election re-
turn under the Canada Elections Act.59 Thus, any major violation of
equitable allocation principles using this method of party political con-
tribution can be brought to the attention of the CRTC, which ulti-
mately controls broadcasting licenses and their renewal.
With regard to content regulation, CBC free time policy allows
only for the monitoring of content for violations of CRTC regulations
and statutory provisions. When the CBC intervened in 1979 over the
use of free time by a provincial party to address federal issues, the
ensuing appeal to the CRTC re-affirmed the regulatory position that
parties should solve these political content problems among them-
56 R.S.C. 1973-74, c. 51, s. 99.
'1 Mickelson, The Electric Mirror (1972) at 252-54.
58 Can., Report of the Special Committee on Election Expenses (1971) at 11.
" CRTC Public Notice, Feb. 2, 1978, "CRTC Guidelines Concerning the Next Federal
General Election" at 4.
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selves.6 0 This position was formally set down in the 1977 CBC policy
statement, Party Political Broadcasts,"1 and is retained in the current
Journalistic Policy manual.6 2 In conjunction with the above, there is no
requirement by the CBC that free time programmes be produced in
CBC studios. But Corporation policy includes an impartial rule that no
CBC-produced tape will be given or loaned to a political party for any
broadcast purpose.
Regulatory attempts to restrict access to paid political broadcast-
ing time are more complex and troublesome than the regulation of free
time political broadcasting. While the goal of equitable allocation once
again underlies regulatory efforts, regulators must face the powerful
interests of the partisan media technocrat and the private broadcaster
rather than the quiescent nature of the public broadcasting corporation.
The CRTC's treatment of "balanced" paid time programming illus-
trates the conflict that may result when the regulatory body deals with
the demands of strong interest groups. The equitable requirement of
balance in the Canadian broadcasting system is legally anchored by
both section 9 of the Television Regulations (first consolidated in
1959)63 and section 3(d) of the Broadcasting Act. The CRTC has cho-
sen to fix this duty on the individual broadcaster rather than interpret-
ing it in terms of the overall system. The logic behind this is that if
each broadcaster provides balanced programming, the aggregate sys-
tem will also reflect this. 4 Had the regulatory agency interpreted sec-
tion 3(d) in another way, one broadcaster (including CBC affiliates)
might be allowed the freedom to accept, for example, only Liberal
Party programming, provided that the regulators could be satisfied that
a predominantly Progressive Conservative Party station log existed
elsewhere. Thus, the regulatory framers opt for tighter control to re-
duce the risk of unfair allocation and unduly complicated administra-
tion, despite the fact that overall balance may still be served by a
scheme less onerous to individual broadcasters.
11.2 Paid Time: The Limits of Equitable Restriction
Free time party political programming is primarily designed to
so Id.
'1 Supra note 31, at section I(1)(v).
" Supra note 47, at 102. The relevant policy statement follows a re-affirmation of free time
provisions:
Such time is made available to parties in both federal and provincial jurisdictions and,
within the restrictions of the law, is entirely under the parties' editorial control.
13 S.O.R./59-456; S.O.R./60-470; now see C.R.C., c. 381.
" Supra note 20, at 439-40.
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meet what regulators, in consultation with broadcasters, deem to be
satisfactory levels of issue discussion to meet perceived minimum dem-
ocratic standards. But the realities of the political bear pit make paid
time broadcasting a necessity rather than an option for Canadian polit-
ical parties. It is in this high stakes area that the pinch of regulation is
felt most acutely.
By 1966, the were were fifty-nine privately-owned television sta-
tions in Canada, although many were CBC affiliates. This represented
a four-fold increase since 1936. Only sixteen of the fifty-nine stations
were owned and operated by the CBC. 5 The parties' dependence on
CBC free time allocations for access to the mass media was therefore
diminished.
In the area of advertising strategy, the one minute "spot" adver-
tisement became the favourite unit of political communication by the
late 1960s. It was now the influential broadcaster-entrepreneur rather
than the government regulator who set the pace. A former vice-presi-
dent of the CTV network explained this trend toward shorter, paid
"spots":
[A]nyone seeking office . . . would do so commensurate with the conditions of
the marketplace, which are the short units. You want frequency; you don't want
length of time. You want to talk to as many people as often as you can.
66
"Spot" advertising in prime time reached the disinterested voter with
greater effect than either fifteen minute free time allocations or even
political coverage on the network news.67 Also, because television was
deemed to be ineffective on a cost-benefit basis for targeting voters in
their ridings (especially in large urban areas), the bulk of paid time
"spots" evolved into party-oriented national network campaigns.
The equitable allocation principles of the 1974 amendments to the
Canada Elections Act also extended to the new phenomena described
above. Section 99.1 now compels network broadcasters to provide paid
time slots to parties after tripartite consultations with party representa-
tives and the CRTC. This section further stipulates that six and one-
half hours of prime time broadcasting be made available to all parties
for use during the statutorily defined campaign period. The parties as a
group are not compelled to purchase all this time on all stations and
networks. The parties must agree among themselves on the amount and
time-slotting of the times they prefer to purchase from broadcasters.
" Supra note 5, at 82.
" Supra note 14, at 57. Testimony of Mr. K. Campbell.
67 Patterson and McClure, TV and the Less Interested Voter (1976), 425 Annals 96.
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Any disagreement may prompt a binding allocation by the CRTC. 8
The role of the CRTC with respect to the time preferences of the par-
ties does recognize a remarkable degree of flexibility because, within
the six and one-half hour access rule, the parties have relative freedom
to determine what proportion of time they Wish, the date of such time
and sometimes even the time of day of broadcast.6 9
The provisions on paid time affect the individual broadcaster in
that the required hours of prime time are often a combination of net-
work time and broadcaster time on the facilities of the broadcaster.
Thus, the statute compels allocative bargaining between individual
broadcasters and their networks.
In the past, section 99 fostered misunderstanding among the inter-
ests involved. Section 99 was substantially amended in 1983.70 For ex-
ample, sections 99.1 to 99.4 of the pre-1984 Act were repealed and a
new set of allocation rules were substituted. The definition of "prime
time" in section 99.4 (repealed) was not equivalent to the normal in-
dustry definition. Under the provisions of section 99.4, the normal defi-
nition as it pertained to television was expanded from the hours of 7:00
p.m. to 11:00 p.m. to the wider period of 6:00 p.m. to midnight.71 Sec-
tion 99 also ignored the thorny question of classifying "spot" time and
"programme" time, further clouding dialogue among regulatory,
broadcasting and partisan interests.
In the mechanistic area of prime time allocation, the regulatory
procedure is initiated by section 99.14(1) of the 1983 Canada Elections
Act. Notice to consult may be served by any party on both the CRTC
and on the other party leaders within thirty days (99.14(2)) of the issu-
ance of the general election writ. This indicates that the party wishes to
consult with its opponents and the regulatory body to allocate the avail-
able six and one-half hours of paid time. In the past, the CRTC was
involved from the start - it set the place of negotiations and the meet-
ing itself was chaired by the CRTC.7 Currently, under section 99.1(4),
the parties can nominate a Broadcasting Arbitrator by consensus, who,
in turn, is appointed by the Chief Electoral Officer and is given com-
plete power to allocate paid time (section 99.15) in the absence of
agreement. If the parties cannot reach a satisfactory agreement, the
88 Specifically, section 99.1 (1), (2), (5). Supra note 20, at 448.
" Grant, Revised Edition of the Broadcasting and Cable Television Regulatory Handbook
(unpublished) at para. 305-32.
70 R.S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164, s. 17. See infra, 111.3 regarding the passage of Bill C-169 on
Oct. 25, 1983.
7' Supra note 52, at 88.
72 Supra note 20, at 450.
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Broadcasting Arbitrator is empowered to make binding allocations
(section 99.15(3)). The clear role of the regulatory body in notifying
and assembling the parties is evident. Under past practice, however,
decisions were usually negotiated between the political parties, with the
CRTC acting as "honest broker" - facilitating, rather than compel-
ling agreement. Under the new regime, the powers of the new Broad-
casting Arbitrator are far more decisive and detached from CRTC ju-
risdiction. The Arbitrator need only notify the CRTC of the allocation
decisions. (section 99.18(1)). However, the criteria for dividing the six
and one-half hours of prime broadcasting time have remained the
same. They include: the proportion of the vote received by each party
in the previous general election, the number of seats held by each party
in the House at the time of dissolution, and the number of candidates
fielded by the party in the last election, with the first two factors
double-weighted. In 1980, for example, the Progressive Conservatives,
following their victory in 1979, were allocated 143 minutes; the Liber-
als 137 minutes, the New Democrats sixty-four minutes, the Social
Credit Party twenty-two minutes and the Communist, Libertarian,
Marxist-Leninist and Rhinoceros parties received six minutes each as
base-line minutage.73 Again, these figures represent merely an upper
limit on how much time parties can purchase. Often parties do not re-
quire or cannot afford to approach allowable limits. Under the current
regime, the appointed Broadcasting Arbitrator cannot allocate to any
registered party more than fifty per cent of the aggregate of the broad-
casting time to be made available under section 99.13 (section
99.15(5)). Where an allocation determined in accordance with the
above-mentioned criteria would, but for section 99.15(5), result in the
receipt by a registered party of more than fifty per cent of the aggre-
gate time, the Arbitrator must allocate the excess time proportionately
to the other registered parties entitled to broadcasting time.
It is important to note that setting a ceiling on the purchase of
time, to promote equitable exposure, conflicts with the media techno-
crats' and private broadcasters' de-regulatory views. A top advertising
executive and media planner for a major party put the de-regulatory
case in this way:
Why should one sector of electioneering be limited versus another? . . . I don't
think there should be any restrictions in this area [television minutage ceilings]
*.*.. You shouldn't have to force a party that has a lot of people willing to put
a lot of money into it to restrict their share of voice. That's fundamentally
73 Supra note 52, at 86.
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undemocratic.7
The best example of the past conflict between regulators and those
who must deal with the legislation from a technological and tactical
point of view involved the pre-1983 allocation system itself (section
99.1, repealed and replaced by the new rules referred to above). This
system was an example of the practical dysfunctions engendered by in-
adequate (though well-intentioned) regulation. Section 99.1(12) (re-
pealed) of the Canada Elections Act required parties to notify broad-
casters of their preferences for paid time slots during the legal
campaign period. This notice had to come within five days of issuance
of the election writs - a provision perhaps designed to convenience the
broadcaster at the expense of party technocrats. Under section
99.1(13), the broadcaster had three days in which to consult with party
spokespersons or party-hired advertising agencies to reach an agree-
ment on time preferences.
One of the problems these rules posed for broadcasters was that
national commercial advertisers might have booked slots in advance -
slots which would have to be pre-empted if a snap federal election was
called. The broadcaster did retain some flexibility in that partisan ad-
vertisers could not legally require, but only request, a particular time
slot on a particular day.75 This allowed the broadcaster to re-schedule
commercial clients. (This continues to be the case under the 1983 revi-
sions.) Nonetheless, because parties can legally require an amount of
time on a particular day, pre-emption of regular advertisers may be
inevitable.
Following the issuance of a CRTC procedural guideline in Febru-
ary, 197876 explaining these allocation rules, the resultant confusion
among broadcasters and party media technocrats prompted an adden-
dum to the guideline. This ad hoc attempt to clarify booking procedure
was intended to provide maximum flexibility to the parties and opti-
mum working conditions to the broadcasters. The process allowed par-
ties to try to book as many of their preferred times as possible, until the
eighteenth day before polling. After the initial booking period, all time
that remained unbooked sixteen or more days after the issuance of the
election writs was put in an undifferentiated central pool. These for-
merly reserved times could now be booked by any party on a first-
come, first-served basis. In the last two weeks of a campaign, a party
could book more time, and the broadcaster must make only "reasona-
74 Id. at 85. Interview with Peter Swain.
71 Supra note 20, at 451.
76 Supra note 57.
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ble" efforts to accommodate the party.
It is significant that the Canadian Association of Broadcasters did
not subscribe to these guidelines. The Association's legal counsel ar-
gued that the old section 99.1 did not provide authority to bind parties
to these procedures. He maintained that the CRTC could not derogate
from section 99.1(11), (12) and (13) (which deal with party-broad-
caster notice and consultation requirements) by issuing its own guide-
lines. Thus the broadcasters seriously questioned the appropriateness of
the specific CRTC restrictions and interventions, notwithstanding the
Commission's primary goal of equitable allocation.
The broadcasters as a group (perhaps rightly) saw that section
99.1 greatly enhanced the powers of the CRTC in the area of political
broadcasting. The agency was transformed from a "strictly regulatory
agency into a quasi-operating one."' 77 It could even be argued that the
CRTC's authority to settle party-broadcaster disagreements amounted
to authority to schedule political broadcasts, should it decide to exer-
cise that authority. Thus, the creation of the Broadcasting Arbitrator in
1983, by the section 99.1(1) amendment, and the removal of power
from the CRTC was welcomed by broadcasting interests.
As it stood, section 99.1 had been labelled "unduly and tremen-
dously overcomplicated" 8 before it was amended in 1983. The Hon.
John Reid, a member of the parliamentary committee overseeing the
Election Expenses Act reforms before his defeat in the 1984 general
election, said this about the paid time procedure:
The role of the CRTC has been a disaster. This [paid time procedure] has per-
haps been the most monumental, glaring failure of all. We're on the way to
another experiment."9
Media technocrats were even less charitable, noting that the old
section 99.1 provisions were "written by people who didn't understand
anything about advertising,"'80 although media technocrat input had
been solicited in an ongoing fashion. Specific dysfunctions still cited by
the media technocrats include the minutage approach to restricting ac-
cess to broadcast media. The minutage approach is flawed when one
considers that a party may buy a large number of costly minutes on
one television station in a large urban market, yet still reach a small
audience. In contrast, in a smaller centre with only one broadcasting
facility, efficacy may be greater. Therefore, the minutage approach is
7 Supra note 5, at 111. Finlay Payne, former CBC executive.
7' Supra note 52, at 85. Interview with Peter Swain.
70 Id. at 86. Interview with Hon. J. Reid, Ottawa, July 9, 1982.
11 Supra note 52, at 87. Interview with Peter Swain.
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an inadequate measure of the regulators' true concern, which is the
measure of communications ability.
Another continuing concern is the undefined rules governing the
central pool of unused time. If a party fails to use a prime time slot
during a programme which attracts a wide audience - a slot for which
it may have done some hard negotiating - can the same slot be ac-
quired by another party should it fall into the unused pool, or does the
air time become "unfixed"? The legislation remains silent on this vex-
ing problem.
The old five-day rule dealing with the tendering of party broadcast
time preferences was attacked by broadcasters and partisan technocrats
alike. In effect, the regulations required party officials and their media
purchasers to predict a need in a particular broadcast market well in
advance, often even before the programming itself was conceived and
prepared. This usually meant that broadcasters could not rely with any
certainty upon written party preferences ostensibly designed to guide
their own actions.
However, the five-day procedure did have the primary effect of
aiding the overall regulatory goal of equitable allocation. Moneyed par-
ties could no longer obtain a head start by acquiring paid time slots by
hiring specialized agencies to quickly tie up the most attractive prime
time slots at the drop of the writs. Given that all submissions had to
reach broadcasters within five days, strategic opportunities may have
been equalized.
The old paid time equitable allocation rules precipitated many de-
vious and unintended advantages for broadcasters. Obeying the rules,
broadcasters blocked off substantial portions of highly valuable air
time. Rather than denying this time to regular advertisers, with the
concomitant chance that it would go unused, some broadcasters sold
the slot twice. Only in the frenzy of last-minute campaigning, when
parties wished to retrieve some of this unused time, did these broad-
casters find themselves in an uncomfortable and embarrassing position.
As well, the expanded definition of "prime time" in section 99.4 (re-
pealed) allowed broadcasters to sell otherwise unattractive air time at,
for example, 11:59 p.m. at normal "prime time" rates. This defeated
the overall legislative aim of reducing partisan political broadcasting
expenditures to less stratospheric levels.
I1.3 The Federal Broadcast Expenditure Subsidy: Equity Through
Reimbursement
In response to the escalating cost of campaigns (due largely to the
expensive nature of broadcast advertising), the 1974 amendments to
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the Canada Elections Act included a fifty per cent reimbursement to
the parties for the cost of their election broadcasts. The rationale for
this direct subsidization by the state was the democratic aim of equal
access to the electronic media in order to foster an informed electorate.
Parties claimed this subsidy by sending documentation of their
electronic broadcasting expenditures to the Chief Electoral Officer, who
determined the amount of the subsidy after a CRTC certificate verified
the rate value of the partisan broadcasts. The subsidy was then paid
directly to the national parties from the government's Consolidated
Revenue Fund.81 In the 1979 federal election, for example, the Progres-
sive Conservative Party spent $1.59 million of a $3.8 million budget on
broadcast time and received $793,967 in reimbursements. Reimburse-
ment figures for the two major parties in the 1980 campaign proved to
be lower than in 1979.82
The goal of equal access to electronic media was furthered by the
fifty per cent reimbursement. The New Democratic Party's percentage
of overall budget spent on broadcast advertising rose more than the
Liberal and Conservative parties' broadcast advertising budgets. The
subsidy may well have been a response to the CRTC decision to compel
the CBC to charge parties for their six and one-half hours of allotted
time. This latter provision automatically increased party advertising
costs by as much as sixty per cent, which was offset by the subsidy.83
However, a more credible explanation may be that the reimbursement
provision was enacted so that minor parties with less money would be
able to enter a very powerful communications forum (at the taxpayer's
expense), a major expense they would otherwise not have been able to
afford. The fifty per cent broadcast media subsidy was therefore an
extreme example of regulatory activism in political broadcasting guided
chiefly by the principles of equitable doctrine. By 1983, the view that
this subsidy skewed partisan expenditure prevailed, and the reimburse-
ment was repealed. It was a temporary corrective measure, not an indi-
cation of a lasting change in attitude, nor a fundamental advance of
equitable doctrine.
II.4 Rate Regulation
The regulation of the cost of paid time political advertising is an-
other clear, if minor, example of the attempt to use regulatory restric-
8' Supra note 20, at 464.
82 Seidle and Paltiel, "Party Finance, the Election Expenses Act and Campaign Spending in
1979 and 1980," in Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls (1981) at 258.
'3 Supra note 52, at 89. Interview with Hon. J. Reid.
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tion to assure political fairness.
In 1965, the BBG stated that:
There is no reference of any kind to rates in the Broadcasting Act, and it is our
view, on advice received, that we have no authority to control rates . . . and no
authority to interfere with rates charged by broadcasters.
4
However, with the enactment in 1973-74 of section 99.3(a) (after 1983:
section 99.24(3)) of the Canada Elections Act, broadcasters are re-
quired to charge political advertisers the same rates as those charged to
any other person for the same time on the same facilities. Should a
broadcaster charge a party or a candidate in excess of the lowest rate
charged to any other person during the campaign for an equal amount
of equivalent time, he would be guilty of an offence liable on conviction
to a fine up to $25,000.
Broadcasters may establish special political rates, lower than those
specified on their rate cards, provided that they are available to all po-
litical parties.8 5 Thus, the regulation of broadcast rates for political ad-
vertising is based on the prevention of discrimination by licensees that
may affect equitable access.
11.5 Dramatization: The De-Regulatory Exception
The Canadian regulatory approach to the question of dramatiza-
tion in political broadcasting from 1936 to 1973 is a striking example
of an exceptional trend away from the policy of strict control to ensure
fairness. The erosion of a cornerstone regulatory provision perhaps best
illustrates the growing influence of the media technocrat in combatting
the conservatism of protective administrators, who are usually reluctant
to allow rule-making to keep pace with technological change.
The prohibition against dramatic forms of political broadcasting
was entrenched in Canadian broadcasting law and policy in one form
or another for thirty-two years. Parliament took great care to prevent
any repetition of the abuses of the dramatic format in the 1935 Con-
servative radio campaign, at the expense of programme flexibility and
broadcasting technique."6 Both section 22(3) of the Broadcasting Act
84 Supra note 6, at 369.
85 See CRTC Public Announcement, April 17, 1978, "Notice to Broadcasters - Federal
General Election."
88 In 1935 a series of dramatized broadcasts were advertised in newspapers, heralding a
shrewd pundit and observer named "Mr. Sage," followed by details of station and time. Conceived
and written for the Conservative Party, the ten minute broadcasts contained many uncharitable
allusions to the Liberal Party and its leader, yet the name of the sponsor of the broadcasts, at least
on the first occasion, was withheld. When regulators insisted that further broadcasts carry a spon-
sor, the name of an advertising agency, not the name of the Conservative Party was given. The
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of 1936 and its 1958 revision (section 17(1)(a)) contained an explicit
prohibition of partisan political broadcasts "in dramatized form."' 87 Be-
tween 1952 and 1958 the BBG had issued a number of circulars that
qualified and redefined this prohibition. For example, BBG Circular 20,
issued on October 27, 1960, ruled that "film material recording the
normal activities of a candidate engaged in an election is not judged to
be 'in dramatized form'."88 Further interpreting the original prohibi-
tion, BBG circulars cautioned broadcasters not to incorporate anything
that would be considered "unnecessarily theatrical."89 While these rul-
ings did not have the force of law, they served as a thin wedge for
media technocrats anxious to abolish the dramatization consideration
entirely. Rulings moved from catalogues of the properties and formats
that would be allowed9" to less sweeping qualifications of "unnecessa-
rily theatrical" that prohibited "cartoons, jingles . . . role-playing and
film footage of political opponents." 9' 1 This loosening of the restrictions
on political broadcasting may well have been a reaction to technologi-
cal change and to the imperatives of the "ad-man". Criticized for tak-
ing the "excitement" out of political campaigns, the BBG began to ease
its rigid interpretation and to encourage broadcasters and politicians to
innovate and experiment with format.92 In the Kennedy era of the tele-
vised political "event", perhaps regulators viewed dramatization pro-
hibitions as inconsistent with the development of the new broadcast
medium.
With the enactment of the 1968 Broadcasting Act, the prohibition
against dramatization was dropped and the CRTC given authority
under section 16(1)(b)(iv) of the Act to regulate the use of dramatic
forms in partisan political programming, reducing to irrelevancy much
of the BBG circular material. In a circular issued in May, 1968,93 the
CRTC invited the parties to set the limits in this area by leaving deci-
sions as to what is "unduly theatrical" in their hands.
Between 1968 and 1972, the CRTC became even more flexible in
that jingles and other formats were acceptable, and by 1973, CRTC
circulars contained no mention of the dramatization question, leaving it
broadcasts provoked an outrage in the popular press. When Mackenzie-King was returned to of-
fice the "Mr. Sage" incident became a focus for the winds of change in broadcasting policy.
87 Supra note 69, at para. 166-67.
88 Supra note 6, at 373.
89 BBG Circular 57, Mar. 12, 1962, in Grant, supra note 69, at para. 152-54.
90 BBG Circular 51, Dec. 18, 1961.
91 Supra note 89.
92 Supra note 5, at 68.
93 CRTC Circular, May 16, 1968, at para. 8.
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to be decided by the parties. Thus, a specialized area of political broad-
casting, begun as an object of external constraint, evolved into a self-
regulated area not bound by an express provision of law.
III. CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION
In examining the general direction of Canadian law and policy in
the field of political broadcasting, an adjunctive theme may well be the
extent to which our adherence to the tenets of restriction (as a means
to a fairer and more equitable political process) adversely affects free-
dom of speech of the individual and, more especially, the broadcaster
and "unregistered" interest group. Nascent constitutional arguments in
Canada, as well as the body of American jurisprudence with respect to
similar regulatory schemes, indicate that the debate on whether politi-
cal broadcast regulation is an abridgement of free speech is weighted in
favour of unconstitutionality.
Prior to the promulgation of the new Constitution in 1982, judicial
history on free speech rights in Canadian society is quite clear. In Ref-
erence re Alberta Legislation,4 free speech was described as the breath
of life,95 yet it was also argued that "freedom of discussion means,...
freedom governed by law." '96 In the 1965 Supreme Court case of Mc-
Kay et al. v. The Queen,97 Martland J. expressed a point of view that is
echoed in the government's approach to political broadcast regulation:
Freedom of discussion is not an unlimited right to urge views, political or other,
at any time, in any place, in any manner. It is a freedom subject to law ... and
may be subject to certain restrictions...98
Given that a broadcast license is still viewed in both Canadian and
American jurisdictions as a gift or indulgence from the public domain,
the freedoms claimed by broadcasters and special interest groups had
to meet a public interest threshold test in order to prevail over pertinent
regulation. This situation has long motivated opposition in the ranks of
potential third party or single-issue advocates whose ire had, until re-
cently, been aimed at section 70.11' of the 1974 Canada Elections Act.
This section constituted an attempt to control election expenditures by
restricting the class of people who may advertise. According to the pro-
visions, only candidates, their official agents, registered party agents or
- [1938] S.C.R. 100 (S.C.C.), (1938), 4 D.L.R. 433 (P.C.).
95 Id. per Duff C.J.C., at 132 (S.C.R.). Cited in Boyer, Political Rights (1981) at 151.
96 Id. at 133.
[1965] S.C.R. 798, 53 D.L.R. (2d) 532.
Id. at 815-16 (S.C.R.) and 548 (D.L.R.).
'4 This section was amended by S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164, s. 14.
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anyone acting with the knowledge and consent of these people could
incur election expenses. Such expenses included the use of air time on
broadcasting facilities as defined in section 2 of the Broadcasting Act.
Third party advocates argued that, although the legislative intent was
to control and balance partisan media spending, section 70.1 also im-
posed a blanket restriction on the free speech of those groups or indi-
viduals who did not qualify under this section. Section 70.1, as origi-
nally enacted, may have been intended to thwart the development of
independent political action committees which sought to influence the
electorate while remaining outside regulation of party campaigning ac-
tivities, yet the statute was continually criticized by special interest
groups as being at odds with fundamental tenets of democracy.
Until the Constitution Act was promulgated in 1982, reliance on
free speech arguments hinged on judicial interpretation of the opening
words of the Preamble to the British North America Act of 1867.100
While declarations such as section one of the Canadian Bill of
Rights1'' (which avers the fundamentality of freedom of speech)
evoked a normative belief, the legal uncertainty of these authorities and
their easy susceptibility to legislative restriction in the public interest
denied to broadcasters protection from further regulatory incursions
and restrained the access of special interest groups to mass
communications.
In 1973, in Re CFRB Ltd. and the Attorney-General of Ca-
nada,0 2 the defendant broadcast licensee attempted to invoke section
l(b) and (d) and section 2 of the Bill of Rights, contending that the
broadcasting "blackout" laws of section 28(1) of the Broadcasting Act
(which prohibited partisan statements on the air on the eve of polling)
were an abridgement of broadcaster free speech rights. The Ontario
Court of Appeal dismissed the licensee's argument by holding that, as
long as licensees are treated "without discrimination," the fairness
goals of section 28(1) were paramount. The Court noted that in this
instance all broadcasters were denied freedoms under the blackout
laws, thus negating a finding of discrimination.03 Critics of the deci-
sion maintain that the medium as a class was subject to blackout rules
under the Broadcasting Act while other media were not, thus founding
a case for discrimination. However, the case demonstrated, above all,
100 Switzman v. Elbling and A.-G. Quebec per Rand J., [1957] S.C.R. 255 at 305, 7 D.L.R.
(2d) 337 at 357-58.
101 S.C. 1960, c. 44.
102 [1973] 3 O.R. 819, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 335 (Ont. C.A.)
103 Id. at 827 and 341-42.
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the futility of relying on an unentrenched constitutional right of free-
dom of speech to defeat the "public trust" test of licensing authorities.
Reliance by broadcasters and special interest advocates on the
guarantees contained in the Charter of Rights and Freedoms may
loosen the regulatory yoke. Section 2(b) of the Charter'04 certainly pro-
vides a constitutional challenge that can be used against the legislative
interference and administrative mechanisms engendered by the Elec-
tion Expenses Act and the Broadcasting Act. Despite "reasonable lim-
its" on this freedom of expression, an important round in the constitu-
tional battle on this issue went against government regulators with the
June, 1984 Alberta Court of Queen's Bench decision in National Citi-
zen's Coalition v. Attorney General of Canada.'
III.1 The American Experience
The American judicial response to the abridgement or potential
abridgement of freedom of speech under the First Amendment is in-
structive as a portent of the Canadian Supreme Court interpretation of
similar constitutional guarantees. Faced with a similar regulatory
framework, the U.S. Supreme Court has produced a body of decisions
that reconcile American equitable doctrine with the constitutional
rights of licensees and extra-party interests.
American doctrine governing broadcasters' coverage of political
news and candidate access to the media rests on four pillars: the public
interest doctrine, the equal time right, the fairness doctrine and the
reasonable access rule. All of these elements have some form or coun-
terpart in Canadian law and policy. In the United States, these rules
are part of a statutory scheme of regulations contained in the Commu-
nications Act, 0 6 and enforced by the Federal Communications Com-
mission (FCC).10 7
The public interest doctrine, embodied in section 309 of the Act,
authorizes the FCC to grant broadcasting licences to those undertaking
to act in the public interest. In the absence of any statutory guidance
on the criteria to be applied, the FCC, acting within its legislative man-
date,108 developed a standard which includes the requirement that po-
' Section 2(b) Everyone has the following fundamental freedoms: (b) freedom of thought,
belief, opinion and expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.
105 (1984), 32 Alta. L.R. (2d) 249 (Q.B.), see discussion, infra Part 111.2.
108 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified in 15, 47 U.S.C.). Current
provisions are codified at 47 U.S.C. ss. 151-609 (1976).
107 The regulatory power of the FCC to make rules and regulations is contained in the Com-
munications Act, 47 U.S.C., s. 154(r), s. 303(r) (1976).
108 Communications Act, 47 U.S.C., s. 309(a) (1976).
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litical news be disseminated. 10 9 This doctrine has its Canadian counter-
part in section 3(d) and section 3(g)(i) of the Broadcasting Act, which
seek a balance of information.
Under section 315(a) of the Communications Act, once a broad-
caster has allowed one political candidate to use its station, it must
afford the candidate's opponents an equal opportunity to do so.""° This
applies only to a personal appearance by the candidate, and specifically
exempts the appearance of a candidate in a bona fide newscast, docu-
mentary or interview."' Much like section 99.24(3)(a) and (b) of the
1983 Canada Elections Act, section 315(b)(i) of the Communications
Act prescribes that this "equal time" doctrine includes non-discrimina-
tory rates compared with charges to political opponents and non-politi-
cal advertisers."
12
The fairness doctrine is legislated in a 1959 amendment to section
315(a) which requires broadcasting licensees to "afford reasonable op-
portunity for the discussion of conflicting views on issues of public im-
portance." Case law exists as well. The Supreme Court applied its
imprimatur to an FCC decision" 3 in the 1969 case of Red Lion Broad-
casting v. FCC."4 In this seminal case, broadcasters attacked FCC
candidate access regulations by contending that the First Amendment
protected their choice to use allotted frequencies "continuously to
broadcast whatever they choose, and to exclude whomever they choose
""' The Court flatly dismissed this challenge and found a contin-
gent right of access to broadcast time for the private individual when
personally attacked or made the subject of a political editorial." 6 Four
years later, in CBS v. Democratic National Convention,"' the Court
did not extend the fairness doctrine to the rights of private individuals
seeking broadcast time to advocate the views of groups with which they
were affiliated."' In the case of editorial advertisement time, the Court
'09 See Report on Commission Policy in Enforcing s. 312(a)(7) of the Communications Act,
(1978) 68 F.C.C. 2d 1079 at 1087-88.
110 See Kennedy for President Comm. v. F.C.C., 636 F. 2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1980). For more
on this doctrine, see Rainey, C.B.S. v. F.C.C. 101 S. Ct. 2813 (1981) (1982), 12 Seton Hall L.
Rev. 659-62.
n Rainey, id.; Downs and Karpen, supra note 25, at 67-70.
12 This amendment was added in 1952. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 879, 66 Stat. 717,
s. 315.
13 In re Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333 (1941).
124 395 U.S. 367 (1969), 89 SC 1794 (1969).
"ll Id. at 386 and 1804.
116 Id. at 385, 391 and 1804, 1806.
17 412 U.S. 94 (1972), 93 SC 2080 (1972).
"I Rainey, supra note 110, at 661.
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was prepared to vest editorial discretion in the licensee in order to
avoid impairing traditional journalistic judgment and risking govern-
mental regulation of content. However, the Court did impose an affirm-
ative duty on the broadcaster to implement the fairness doctrine in
other circumstances, enumerated previously in the Red Lion case.11
The fairness doctrine is less certain and precise than the equal
time doctrine. It merely requires the licensee to act reasonably and in
good faith. Discretion (as to whether a controversial, important public
issue is involved, which viewpoints are to be presented and which for-
mat and spokespersons are suitable) is left to the licensee.1 0
Thus, the preceding three doctrines often fell short of enforcing
access claims against licensees. However, in the great wave of reform
of the early 1970s designed to increase information flow to the electo-
rate and to reduce the cost of campaigns, Congress enacted the Federal
Election Campaign Act.' 2' Part of this reform included the enactment
of the current section 312(a) (7) of the Communications Act, which
mandated "reasonable access" and authorized the FCC to revoke a
broadcaster's license for "willful or repeated failure" to allow regis-
tered federal candidates access to or purchase of broadcast time.
The preceding four pillars of American campaign broadcasting
law and policy have come under fire in the 1980s. Indeed, in 1981, the
bi-partisan, seven-member FCC voted four to two to urge congressional
repeal of the equal time and fairness laws. While opponents of this
move cited systemic factors (such as voter volatility, cost of television
time and the media's influence on candidates' strategy, selection and
issue emphasis) to support their arguments that the doctrines were nec-
essary to prevent undue concentration of power, the constitutional issue
seemed beyond question.'22 This issue was resolved in favour of regula-
tory enactments of the equitable doctrines.
In Red Lion, broadcasters argued the same point as that raised by
the defence in the Canadian case concerning section 70.1 of the 1974
Elections Act (Re CFRB): that equitable restrictive doctrines did not
apply to other media, and were therefore discriminatory. The Court
held that "differences in the characteristics of news media justify dif-
ferences in the First Amendment standards applied to them.' 23 In-
deed, in a subsequent case, the Court struck down a statute legislating
-19 412 U.S. 94 (1972) at I11, and 2090.
120 Supra note 25, at 74.
121 Pub. L. No. 92-275, 86 Stat. 3 (1972).
122 Supra note 25.
123 Red Lion, supra note 114, at 389 (U.S.).
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equal allotment of candidate space in newspapers as in violation of the
First Amendment rights of publishers.' 24 Thus, the special nature ac-
corded broadcasting in Canadian statutes may allow Canadian courts
to distinguish constitutional challenges along these lines as well. In ad-
dition, the issue of public trusteeship, unique to broadcasting, has been
fully developed in American constitutional law. Because a broadcasting
license confers a finite, publicly-owned, benefit upon the licensee, the
holder, as agent for the entire community, is burdened by the enforcea-
ble obligation of reasonableness."a 5 The concept of balance and the
characterization of the First Amendment as the assurance of the free
flow of ideas, combined with the reality of the finite nature of the
broadcasting frequency spectrum, caused the Court in Red Lion to
hold that it was "idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right
to broadcast comparable to the right of every individual to speak, write
or publish.' 26
In the recent 1981 American Supreme Court decision in CBS,
ABC and NBC v. FCC,27 this interpretation of regulatory para-
mountcy over free speech guarantees in the area of political broadcast-
ing was affirmed and perhaps expanded. The suit stemmed from the
networks' refusal to allow Jimmy Carter, presidential candidate for re-
election, to broadcast his candidacy announcement early in the 1980
election year. In what was seen as a partisan decision, 2 ' the FCC held
for Carter and maintained that the networks violated the reasonable
access requirements of section 312(a) (7). The Supreme Court upheld
the FCC ruling on the Red Lion rationale. However, the latter case
involved an individual's right to respond. In the CBS case, the right of
access was not contingent on anything that had previously been broad-
cast. Thus, the regulatory power of the FCC to curtail broadcasters'
speech was enhanced, although the Court did deny that a general right
of media access to candidates was mandated by the First Amendment,
without consideration on an individual basis.'2 9
With regard to spending limitations, recent interpretations by the
American Supreme Court' 30 have held that independent individual and
corporate campaign expenditures (all of which gravitate toward broad-
124 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo. 418 U.S. 241 (1974), 94 SC 2831 (1974).
1215 Red Lion, supra note 114. See opinion of White, J. for unanim6us Court at 389.
126 Id. at 388.
127 347 U.S. 284 (1981), 74 SC 593 (1981).
128 The decision split on partisan lines. See the dissenting opinion of Stevens, J., id. at 314.
126 CBS, supra note 127, at 297-98.
120 For example, First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti 435 U.S. 765 (1977) at 788.
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cast advertising) could not be restrained. In CBS the Court linked the
right of the audience to hear the candidate's message with the candi-
date's own right of speech, and granted him a First Amendment prior-
ity over broadcasters.'
111.2 Canadian Decisions before June, 1984
In interpreting section 2(b) of the Charter, it was believed that
Canadian courts would weigh impending challenges in favour of the
interests of an informed electorate and the sanctity of the public nature
of the airwaves as against the selective circumscription of the licensee's
right to free speech.
With regard to the more troublesome legislative restriction on who
may advertise (alluded to earlier with respect to section 70.1 of the
Canada Elections Act), Canadian courts had already tested this re-
striction before the National Citizen's Coalition case (supra) was
launched in January, 1984, though not as a constitutional issue.132 The
constitutionality of limitations on third party broadcast advocacy may
prove to be a well-spring of litigation in the aftermath of the 1984 Ca-
nadian general election, despite the "reasonable limits" safety-valve
provided in section 1 of the Charter. As Canada's Chief Electoral Of-
ficer, Jean-Marc Hamel, commented in 1983, "More and more the ap-
parent dichotomy between freedom of expression and the control of
election expenses will surface.'1 3 3 American judicial interpretation on
this point has resulted in the anomaly of the "parallel campaign." Me-
dia expenditures that cannot be linked to the official campaign of a
candidate or party escape regulation and find refuge under the um-
brella protection of constitutionally guaranteed free speech.' The
seminal decision in Buckley v. Valeo 3' abolished all spending limita-
tion legislation as violative of the First Amendment.
By contrast, spending limitations form the bedrock of the overall
Canadian regulatory system at the level of federal election campaign-
ing. However even these provisions were unable to prohibit third-party
spending outside their ambit, regardless of constitutionality. For exam-
ple, section 70.1(4) (repealed in 1983) of the Elections Act provided a
13' See Alexander, Financing the 1980 Election (1983) at 404; Warin, Litigating the 1980
Election (1982), 31 Am. U. L. Rev. 545.
"I2 R. v. Risdon (unreported), July 26, 1979 (Ont. Prov. Ct.); R. v. Roach (1978), 25 O.R.
(2d) 767, 48 C.C.C. (2d) 405 (Co. Ct.).
"' Letter to the author (June 8, 1983).
13 See Buckley v. Valeo, supra note 3; First National Bank v. Bellotti, supra note 130.
,' Buckley, id.
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defence to any person who, while not a candidate, registered party or
agent, incurred election expenses in good faith for the purpose of gain-
ing support for views held by that person on an issue of public policy or
for the purpose of advancing the aims of any organization or associa-
tion of a partisan character of which that person is a member and on
whose behalf the expenses were incurred. In cases such as R. v.
Roach,136 decided by an Ottawa Provincial Court in 1977, it was held
that it was extremely difficult to enforce section 70.1 because of the
defence provided. In fact, it was quite easy for single-issue groups to
advertise heavily in support of or in dissent with a candidate, as long as
their expenditure was linked to some matter of public policy. The spec-
tre of massive infusions of broadcasting dollars from outside the regula-
tory framework thus loomed large on the horizon of future general
elections even before the watershed National Citizen's Coalition
decision.
In 1983, the federal Office of the Chief Electoral Officer contem-
plated legislative action to close the section 70.1 loophole without run-
ning into the free speech quagmire that had swallowed American
spending limitations. Based upon section 3 of the Charter, which guar-
antees every citizen the democratic right to "be qualified for member-
ship" in the House of Commons, the prohibitive third-party spending
amendment would be premised on the idea that "it is essential that all
persons be treated in the same manner during an election." 137 At that
time, the federal amendment under study favoured the Quebec Loi
regissant le financement des partis politiques. Article 105.1 of that
Act,138 contains the following prohibition:
105.1 Pendant une 6lection personne autre que l'agent officiel d'un candidat ou
d'un parti reconnu ne doit faire ou autoriser des d~penses 6lectorales. [During an
election period, only the official agent of a candidate or of a recognized party
may incur or authorize election expenses.]
In a challenge to the Quebec prohibition involving advertising ex-
penditures made by the Centrale de L'Enseignment du Quebec
(C.E.Q.) in the April 13, 1981 provincial election,139 Mr. Justice Ray-
mond Bernier tested the provision against the Quebec Human Rights
legislation and found the C.E.Q. guilty of a strict liability offence in
violating Article 105.1. On the question of abridgement of free speech
1' Supra note 132. The president of a local labour union was charged under s. 70.1 for
having incurred an election expense by contracting for an aircraft and banner (urging people not
to vote for the Liberals) to fly over an Ottawa constituency on the day before polling.
1 7 Supra note 133.
138 L.R.Q. 1977, c. F-2, Article 105.1.
139 Boucher c. C.E.Q. (unreported), Feb. 10, 1982 (Que. Prov. Ct.).
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rights, the court held that:
Je partage enti~rement l'avis exprim6 par l'Honorable Juge Claude Guerin dans
la d6cision Benoit Roberge c. Le Procureur Gnral de la Province de Qubbec a
1'effet que la libert6 d'expression n'est pas 6quivalente A la libert6 de d~penses.
En effect, les dispositions de 'article 105 ne restreignent pas le droit de
s'exprimer mais bien le droit de dbpenser pour s'exprimer. . . [italics in original].
[I fully agree with the idea expressed by the Honourable Juge Claude Guerin, in
Benoit Roberge c. Le Procureur Gngral de la Province de Quebec, to the effect
that the freedom of speech is not equivalent to the freedom of expenditure. In
effect, the provisions of Article 105 do not restrict the right to express yourself,
but rather, the right to spend to express yourself.]
40
This divorcing of money from pure speech, coupled with the asser-
tion that monetary expenditure was not necessarily a political state-
ment, not only contrasted with the American experience, but boded ill
for future Charter-based constitutional challenges to equitable limita-
tions on third-party or interest group spending at the federal level.
However, the first major challenge to the wider principles upon which
paid political broadcasting regulation rested led to a subsequent rejec-
tion of this line of thinking in the National Citizen's Coalition case.
111.3 Bill C-169 and the Constitution: A New Judicial Trail Opened?
As noted, current legislation precludes anyone but a candidate,
,party or their official agents from incurring expenditures designed to
promote or oppose a particular candidate or party (section 70.1 Canada
Elections Act). This general rule makes paid political advertising at the
federal level a "closed shop" between the official parties and broadcast-
ers. However, prior to October, 1983, the wide-sweeping defence to any
person or organization incurring election expenses "in good faith" for
the purposes specified (section 70.1(4), now repealed) sparked increas-
ing dissatisfaction among those charged with administering federal
election law.
In 1983 the federal Chief Electoral Officer reported on the
portentous dangers inherent in the section 70.1(4) "loophole":
As it now stands, the wording of this section permits any person or non-political
organization or association to incur election expenses, between the date of the
issue of the writ for an election and the day immediately following polling day, to
directly promote or oppose a particular candidate. In defending any prosecution
initiated under this section, these individuals or organizations may claim that
they were "promoting an issue of public policy" or that they were "advancing the
aims of their organization" even though they did not identify those issues and/or
aims in their advertisements, provided that they are able to show they were act-
ing in good faith.
140 Id. at 7.
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It is a matter of record that a number of persons who were not acting on behalf
of or with the knowledge and consent of candidates or registered agents of politi-
cal parties have availed themselves of this provision of the Act during past elec-
tions. These people have spent unlimited sums of money to promote or oppose a
particular candidate or registered party, sums which they do not have to account
for in terms of sources or amount.""'
The Report went on to propose that subsections 70.1(3) and (4) be
deleted from the Act, thus removing any defence which interest groups,
anxious to flood the electoral air waves, could use to circumvent regula-
tory restriction. It was further recommended that contravention of any
prohibition against spending "directly" to promote or oppose a particu-
lar candidate or party be made a corrupt practice under the Act.
1 42
The Chief Electoral Officer's Report underlined the intent accompany-
ing the changes made subsequently in Parliament.
In the House of Commons, Bill C-169, amending the Canada
Elections Act in accordance with the foregoing recommendations re-
ceived Second Reading and passed at all stages within minutes on Oc-
tober 25, 1983. While Members from both opposition parties remarked
on the likelihood of impinging on the right of individuals or organiza-
tions to represent their opinions during a federal campaign the overrid-
ing concern for equality won all-party support for the Bill. It was also
acknowledged that interest group spending was still permitted outside
the campaign period and in any case, a more restrictive regime during
the campaign period would better facilitate administrative concerns.
143
The relevant amendment, contained in section 14 of the Bill, effec-
tively closed all opportunity for interest group spending. 44 Violation,
on summary conviction, could lead to a fine of up to $1,000 and possi-
ble imprisonment for up to one year. On indictment, the maximum fine
is $5,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.
141 Can., Statutory Report of the Chief Electoral Officer (1983) at 74.
112 Id. See recommendation H-32.
M Hansard, Oct. 25, 1983 at 28295-99.
141 14. Subsection 70.1(2) to (4) of the said Act are repealed and the following substituted
therefor:
"(2) Every registered agent of a registered party and every other person acting on behalf
of a registered party who, with the actual knowledge and consent of an officer
thereof, between the date of the issue of the writs for a general election and the day
immediately following polling-day, incurs election expenses for the primary purpose
of promoting the election of a particular candidate or peison likely to become a
candidate, other than the leader of the party, and not primarily for the purpose of
promoting or opposing a particular registered party is, unless such expenses are in-
curred on behalf of the particular candidate, guilty of an offence against this Act.
(3) Where a person is found guilty of an offence under this Act by having contravened
subsection (1) or (2) and such contravention was made with the knowledge or consent
of a candidate, an official agent or the registered agent of a registered party, that
candidate, official agent or registered agent is also guilty of a corrupt practice."
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Against this background a court challenge to the legislation was
launched in an Alberta court on January 16, 1984. The full impact of
the National Citizen's Coalition Inc. v. The Attorney General for Ca-
nada has not been felt as yet by the broadcasting industry in Canada.
However the import of the decision on the complexion and volume of
future political broadcasting was recognized by advertiser and broad-
caster alike even as the 1984 general election campaign progressed.
In bringing their action, the National Citizen's Coalition Inc.
sought a declaration that rights guaranteed by the Charter were being
infringed or denied and therefore had no force and effect. They relied
on earlier court interpretations of section 1 of the Charter to insist that
the onus of proving no infringement of rights rested squarely on the
federal government. 14 5 Accordingly, positive arguments or citation of
supporting American decisions were not introduced by the plaintiff.
The defendant enunciated the federal government's interpretation
of "election expenses," found at section 2(1) of the Canada Elections
Act:
1 46
My Lord, in answer to what my learned friend has just said about speaking out,
it should be clear, Sir, that by reading the definition of "election expenses" that
the only ban is on direct support or direct opposition. There is no ban on anybody
speaking out.
With respect to speaking out, anyone can say anything during the election pe-
riod, the ban is on expenditure. That is, spending money in direct opposition or
14' See Quebec Assoc. of Protestant School Boards et al. v. A.-G. of Quebec et al. (no. 2)
(1982), 140 D.L.R. (3d) 33, 3 C.R.R. 114 (Que. Sup. Ct.).
146 2(l) "election expenses" means
(a) amounts paid,
(b) liabilities incurred,
(c) the commercial value of goods and services donated or provided, other than volunteer
labour, and
(d) amounts that represent the differences between amounts paid and liabilities incurred
for goods and services, other than volunteer labour, and the commercial value thereof
where they are provided at less than their commercial value, (all of which are in this
definition referred to as "the cost") for the purpose of promoting or opposing, directly
and during an election, of a particular candidate, and without limiting the generality
of the foregoing, includes
(e) the cost of acquiring the right to the use of time on the facilities of any broadcasting
undertaking as defined in section 2 of the Broadcasting Act, or of acquiring the right
to the publication of an advertisement in any periodical publication for any such
purpose,
(f) the cost of acquiring the services of any person, including remuneration and expenses
paid to him or on his behalf, as an official agent or registered agent or otherwise,
except where such services are donated or provided at materially less than their com-
mercial value,
(g) the cost of acquiring meeting space, of provision of light refreshment and of acquiring
and distributing mailing objects, material or devices of a promotional nature, and
(h) the cost of goods or services provided by a government, crown corporation or any
other public agency,
when such costs are incurred for a purpose set out in this definition. ..
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direct support. There is no ban on spending money to put forward your views so
long as they are not directly supporting or directly opposing, and their views can
in addition include indirect support or indirect opposition.
147
This argument on behalf of the Government reflected the earlier adop-
tion, by the Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, of practical guidelines
on the meaning of "direct" spending under section 2 of the federal Act.
Under these guidelines, advocacy spending or advertising promoting a
distinct policy position would be allowed. However, spending on adver-
tising by interest groups which either named candidates or parties or
relied on "polling" the voting records of targeted legislators would not
be allowed, as they would be characterized as "direct" advocacy.
On June 27, 1984, Medhurst J. handed down the judgment in the
National Citizen's Coalition case and, in so doing called into question
the whole regulatory regime of tightly controlled spending restrictions
in the interest of equitable principles. In deciding for the plaintiff and
against the constitutionality of the amendments in Bill C-169, the
Court made the following fundamental and sweeping remarks:
I believe, however, that the sections, on their face, do limit the actions of anyone
other than registered parties or candidates from incurring election expenses dur-
ing the prescribed time [during campaigns] and in this sense there is a restriction
on freedom of expression. If such constraint is to be allowed then, in my view it
must meet the tests set out in Section 1 of the Charter...
This involves a weighing of the individual right of freedom of expression in rela-
tion to the said benefits to society of an effective system for the election of mem-
bers of Parliament...
Fears or concerns of mischief that may occur are not adequate reasons for im-
posing a limitation. There should be actual demonstration of harm or a real like-
lihood of harm to a society value before a limitation can be said to be justified
In my view, it has not been established to the degree required that the funda-
mental freedom of expression need be limited. The limitation has not been shown
to be reasonable or demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. 4"
The decision threw the carefully built rationale of partisan politi-
cal advertising regulation into chaos on the eve of the 1984 general
election. It is still unclear whether the new Progressive Conservative
Government will vigorously pursue an appeal from this lower court de-
cision. While in opposition, the Progressive Conservative Party allowed
strictures like Bill C-169 to pass through the House expeditiously. As it
now stands, the constitutional leverage of section 2 of the Charter has
been used to break the pattern of policy in the realm of party political
advertising regulation and introduces into the game formerly played
147 p. j. McCaffrey, Q.C., Vol. I of the official transcript of the proceedings at 35.
148 Supra note 105, at 254-55, 264.
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between broadcasters, parties and regulators only, a new special inter-
est player. The wild card of massive infusions of paid political messages
sponsored by "parallel campaigns" run by political action committees
in support of partisan campaigns heretofore strictly regulated looms
large on the regulatory horizon and threatens to sweep aside the re-
stricted system as it has evolved to 1984.
IV. CONCLUSION
The ambit of this paper has been restricted to government regula-
tion of federal party political broadcasts during electoral campaigns. A
wider consideration of the potential for the abuse of broadcasting in-
cludes political programming that filters through "news" rather than
sponsored advertising, and even the use or abuse of government adver-
tising. Both these issues, while outside the scope of this paper, are im-
portant future issues in Canadian electoral politics and currently skirt
the ambit of federal broadcast regulation.
The narrow terms of reference of this paper do not do justice to
the length and strength of the regulator's grasp. Cable television, by-
elections and provincial electoral jurisdictions are all now affected by
this type and manner of regulation. But the issues raised in this paper
tend to support the view that political broadcasting in Canada is still
governed largely by a belief in restriction and control from the centre
that is slow to adapt to changing technology. The inter-relationship be-
tween partisan technocrat, broadcaster and regulator has shown that
the fairness ideology often competes with technological change and
usually lags behind it to the degree that, despite the policy of restric-
tion, some latitude must be given to the broadcaster.
The hallmark of political campaign broadcasting regulation in Ca-
nada is dynamic tension. The medium of television, with its perceived
unique power to command, has received the special attention of Parlia-
ment. A ring of protective law and policy has evolved which, though
conceived to assure fairness, has been viewed as too paternalistic and
meddlesome by the actors involved in the day-to-day functional dimen-
sion of the broadcasting system. In some instances, broadcasters and
technocrats succeed in the push-and-pull of regulatory restriction, and
the regulators relax the reins on discretion and innovation. This was so
with the dramatization issue between 1936 and 1973, and the issue of
paid time allocation by party preference since 1982.
All of these points are to a greater or lesser extent reflected in the
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most recent round of amendments. 49 The regulatory role of the CRTC
has been clarified. Because of the inability of the CRTC to handle its
role as regulator and mediator, a new officer, the Broadcasting Arbitra-
tor, has been created to act as the mediator and decision-maker be-
tween the political parties, the broadcasters and the CRTC. Thus, the
need for a true interest broker has at last been realized. As well, the
fifty per cent electronic media rebate provision, which tended to skew
party spending patterns, and interfere with the interests of equitable
broadcasting, has been dropped.
However, the legal freedoms of the broadcaster and partisan not-
withstanding, the guiding spirit of regulatory policy continues, to follow
the precepts of increased control and involvement in political program-
ming decisions. This basic trend was also illustrated in the proposed
legislative amendments under consideration by the defeated Liberal
government. For example, according to the Honourable John Reid,
what was proposed was "a more rigid formula as to the allocation of
time for the major political parties and provisions to ensure that new
parties which spring up will have access to the broadcasting media as
well."'150 This proposal is now law and is contained in section 99.16 of
the Canada Elections Act. Inherent in this single provision is both the
realization that nebulous regulation has tended to hinder and compli-
cate the work of the broadcasters and technocrats, who must deal with
dysfunctions imposed from outside the industry, and the assertion that
continued activism is necessary to ensure fairness.
149 S.C. 1980-81-82-83, c. 164.
150 Letter to the author from Hon. John Reid, then chairman of the committee overseeing the
Election Expenses Act, June 14, 1983.
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